Sudan faces the risk of widespread famine in the coming months, as the repercussions of a war that has raged for more than three years have coincided with a severe drought that has struck agricultural production areas, while the army leadership continues to reject proposals for a humanitarian ceasefire and links a cessation of hostilities to the fulfillment of military conditions on the ground.
Estimates from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) indicate that approximately 5.1 million people are already facing severe levels of hunger, while the World Food Program expects an additional 350,000 people to fall into acute hunger by the end of 2026, with that number rising to about 1.2 million by August 2027.
An in-depth report published by Reuters on Friday revealed that the rainy season between July and September 2026 recorded its lowest levels in Sudan in more than three decades, causing crop failures, livestock emaciation, and shrinking pastures in key food-producing regions, including Darfur, Kordofan, and Gedaref.
According to data from the U.S. Geological Survey, rainfall in North Darfur fell to its lowest level since 1984, the year that saw one of the worst famines in the history of Sudan and the region. North Kordofan State also recorded its lowest rainfall since 1990, while Gedaref State—which has remained one of the most important sources of food during the war years—saw its lowest level since 1991.
These estimates serve as an early warning that the crisis is heading toward a more dangerous phase, particularly in Darfur and Kordofan, where the effects of drought compound displacement, fighting, and difficulties in delivering humanitarian aid.
Officials at the World Food Program said the organization aims to provide food to about five million of the most vulnerable Sudanese, but it cannot reach them all. As of October 17, the program’s operations in Sudan had only $276 million available—less than half of last year’s budget—while it needs an additional $134 million to address hunger caused by the drought.
The funding shortfall has led to a 50 percent reduction in food rations at the Tawila camp in Darfur, even though the camp houses some 700,000 displaced people and received nearly 9,000 new arrivals between early September and mid-October.
In the agricultural state of Gedaref in eastern Sudan, a prominent farmer who manages farms covering about 14,700 hectares said his expected harvest would not exceed 25 percent of last year’s production, even if additional rain falls. On October 20, the state recorded temperatures ranging from 7 to 9 degrees Celsius above the historical average.
These indicators come at a time when the army leadership is clinging to the option of war, despite repeated international warnings that continued fighting is squandering any chance of saving the agricultural season and opening humanitarian corridors.
The United States had proposed a 90-day humanitarian truce, to be followed by arrangements for a permanent ceasefire and a civilian-led political process, but the army leadership and the Port Sudan authorities rejected the proposal, stipulating that the Rapid Support Forces must withdraw from all cities before they would accept it. On October 7, Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan also announced his refusal to negotiate, vowing to continue operations until all territories under the control of the Rapid Support Forces were recaptured.
This stance represents a continuation of the “military solution” rhetoric adopted by the army leadership, despite the inability of either side in the war to achieve a victory that would end the conflict, and despite the mounting human cost. Every additional month of fighting disrupts agriculture, markets, and transportation routes; increases displacement; and expands the areas that are difficult for humanitarian organizations to access.
The army’s responsibility does not absolve the Rapid Support Forces of their responsibility for the disaster; aid agencies accuse both sides of the war of imposing restrictions on access to food and medicine. However, the army bears double the responsibility due to its repeated rejection of ceasefire proposals and its insistence on military preconditions for a ceasefire—a stance that has closed windows of opportunity that could have allowed for the rescue of civilians and the safeguarding of the agricultural season.
In response to these warnings, the Port Sudan authorities have downplayed the severity of the decline in production. Agriculture Minister Ismat Quraishi said this year’s harvest will be smaller, but “will not be significantly lower” than last year’s—an assessment that contradicts rainfall data, farmers’ accounts, and forecasts by international organizations.
The current crisis reveals that the potential famine will not be the result of drought alone, but rather the result of the interaction between the climate and a political war whose leaders have chosen to continue fighting at the expense of civilian lives.
Drought is devastating crops, but the war is hindering agriculture, transportation, and relief efforts, and the refusal to agree to a ceasefire is closing the last remaining windows of opportunity to avert disaster.
While the army leadership raises the banner of decisiveness, the economic crisis is escalating, and the circle of hunger is silently widening; thus, the pressing question is no longer who will achieve military victory, but how many millions of Sudanese will pay the price for a war that its leadership—led by Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan—refuses to stop.
