At a time when army forces are retreating in the face of the Rapid Support Forces across Sudan’s battlefields—particularly in light of recent developments in Blue Nile— Army Commander General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan has made changes at the top of the military hierarchy, sparking a storm of controversy amid a flurry of analyses regarding the significance and timing of the move, given that it represents the largest military restructuring since the outbreak of the war…
Measures and Decisions
What is surprising about Burhan’s decisions—which are of a military-administrative nature—is that they were discussed on platforms, whether personal or affiliated with institutions linked to the Islamic Movement (classified as a terrorist organization), or by those associated with or close to it, even before the army itself announced these decisions. Burhan’s decisions included the formation of a new Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with promotions and retirements among senior officers. The circular issued by the army announced the appointment of Yasser al-Ata as Chief of Staff, as well as the appointment of Lieutenant General Abdulkhair Abdullah Nasser Darjam as Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, Lieutenant General Mu’tasim Abbas al-Tom Ahmed as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Lieutenant General Haider Ali al-Tarifi as Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, and Lieutenant General Khalaf Allah Abdullah Idris as Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, while Lieutenant General Mohammed Ali Ahmed Sabir assumed the presidency of the Military Intelligence Directorate.
The decisions also included promotions to the rank of lieutenant general for a number of officers, including Muhyiddin Abkar Mohammed Saleh, Ahmed Saleh Ahmed Aboud, Rabi’ Fadlallah Mustafa, Adel Al-Obaid Abdul Rahim, and Amir Fadlallah Mohammed Ali.
In this context, Lieutenant General Magdi Ibrahim Othman Khalil and Lieutenant General Khalid Abdin Mohamed Ahmed Al-Shami were retired following their promotion to the rank of General, in addition to the promotion of Major General Engineer Omar Sar Al-Khatim Hassan Nasr to the rank of General and his retirement.
The decisions also included the retirement of Lieutenant General Dr. Al-Mahdi Abdulrahman Muhammad Omar and Lieutenant General Nasr al-Din Abdulqayyum Ahmad Ali.
Many observers viewed Al-Burhan’s move within the army as coinciding with unfavorable internal and external conditions, as battlefields are shifting toward a form of long-term attrition warfare between the two sides, The intensity of the bombardment of cities has increased, alongside the army’s growing reliance on militias and irregular forces—including volunteers, conscripts, and elements of the popular resistance. All of this is accompanied by mounting international pressure to achieve a ceasefire and a settlement to end the war, which the army has consistently obstructed.
Meanwhile, other unsubstantiated analyses suggest that Al-Burhan’s moves within the army are an attempt to defuse international tension in the face of his stalling to reach a truce that would spare what remains of Sudan from further harm, and that the move suggests he is setting the stage domestically to pave the way for other political steps he intends to take, especially since the moves he has made precede the third Berlin Conference, which is hoped to be held on April 15.
Why Yasser al-Ata?
However, what was most surprising about Burhan’s decisions was his appointment of his former aide—and the head of operations in Omdurman since the start of the war—Yasser al-Ata, as Chief of Staff. Al-Ata is known for defying Burhan and going against the directives Burhan seeks to enforce, Perhaps the clearest evidence of this is what Sudanese memory recalls from the time Burhan was besieged at the General Command before the international agreement with the Rapid Support Forces to secure his release and allow him to travel to Jeddah. At that time, Burhan’s justification for requesting the lifting of the siege was Yasser al-Ata’s high standing and his intense media presence, which many described as a move to elevate al-Ata while sidelining Burhan and al-Kabashi, who were besieged at the time, and that those supporting him were members of the Islamic Movement and its leaders at the time. These remained Al-Burhan’s justifications in persuading the civilian political leaders he was in contact with at the time to convince the Rapid Support Forces commander to allow him to leave the General Command so he could proceed to sign the Jeddah Agreement, arguing that Al-Ata did not want peace and was leading the Islamists to continue the war—before Al-Burhan himself reneged on his promises.
However, this surprise quickly dissipates with the former military source’s remarks, who said: “Al-Atta’s appointment as Chief of Staff cannot be viewed in isolation from his role over the past two years, during which he emerged as one of the foremost architects of the transition from a traditional army to a tactical one.” He added: “Al-Atta was among the first to insist on moving toward popular mobilization and recruitment, both within the capital Khartoum and outside it—specifically in the states of River Nile, Northern, and Al-Jazirah.” The source noted that Al-Atta spared no effort to ensure the success of his plan by taking steps that had no connection to the nationalist nature of the military institution, and continued: “Yasser was not shy about playing a tangible and well-known role in linking tribal mobilization to the military establishment.”
The source noted that the appointment of Al-Atta signifies, among other things, a shift in the army’s center of gravity from the military institution as an entity to a larger, broader network of formations—including both regular units and militias fighting alongside the army, the core of which consists of Islamist militants. He added: “Not to mention the social networks of Sudanese army commanders who were recruited to fight under the pretext that ‘the people of the West want to rule Sudan.’ Here, it is important to recall that Al-Atta is among the most hardline figures in confronting the Rapid Support Forces.”
The military source emphasized that while this move may appear successful at first glance, its danger lies in the future, as it will deepen and widen the rift in Sudanese society.
The source considered that the appointment of Yasser Al-Atta as the army’s top military official clearly indicates that Al-Burhan does not intend to negotiate or seek a truce and that he may wish to proceed with offensive plans, given that Al-Atta is among the most hardline advocates of a military solution.
In-Depth Analysis
The former high-ranking military source provided an in-depth analysis of recent shifts within the military command structure, noting that the appointment of Mohamed Ali Sabir as head of military intelligence cannot be separated from the broader context of the war itself evolving into a more complex and intertwined conflict. Referring to what UN and media reports revealed in 2024 and 2025 regarding widespread breaches in supply lines within Khartoum and Darfur, as well as the emergence of arms smuggling networks across the western and southern borders, he said: “All of this clearly reflects that the battle is no longer being decided solely on the front lines, but deep within the rear networks.”
According to the source, the role of military intelligence is poised to go beyond its traditional tasks of gathering information to become a central tool in the conduct of the war itself, by dismantling the Rapid Support Forces’ supply networks, monitoring activity within areas under army control, and managing the complex relationship with regional allies, particularly regarding arms procurement, which he summarizes—in his own words—as a shift toward the “militarization of intelligence” rather than merely its development.
In this context, the source noted that the appointment of Lieutenant General Mu’tasim Abbas al-Tom to the operations post reflects the direct introduction of an international dimension into the battle management room, saying: “ Muatasim holds a bachelor’s degree in political science and strategic studies, and has published research on “foreign interventions in Sudanese affairs,” in addition to his active participation in the current war, especially as he was a member of the Central Command and Control Authority.” Noting that Al-Tom’s selection reflects the army’s need for an operations commander who understands the political and international dimensions of military battles.
The source explained that the need for such a figure is highlighted by the increasing use of drones, which means the army requires continued external supply in the areas of military technology, surveillance, and advanced communications, as well as forms of undeclared intelligence support.
The source believes that having an operations commander with a political and academic background means that military decisions are no longer made in isolation from broader calculations, including how to interpret the reactions of international capitals—primarily Washington—to any field operations, the reactions of neighboring countries, and the implications of these for any potential negotiation tracks. He added: “This shift reflects a clear transition toward a politically managed war, not merely a traditional military confrontation.”
The Secret of Timing
The source revealed a more sensitive dimension that had been overlooked in the analyses: an internal conflict within the military establishment itself. He noted that a conflict had been ongoing since mid-2024, characterized by a split between a faction seeking a complete military victory and another inclined to accept a phased settlement. He said: “The recent changes have temporarily tipped the balance in favor of the first faction by strengthening their positions within the leadership, while figures known for their political flexibility have been sidelined or marginalized. This means that the military establishment has—albeit temporarily—resolved its internal debate in favor of the ‘hawkish line.’”
On the ground, the source noted that the nature of control within the capital, Khartoum, has undergone a qualitative shift over the past year, as control is no longer purely military but has become multifaceted, encompassing security, intelligence, and social dimensions—a development that, in his assessment, necessitated a redistribution of influence within the city. He noted that the new appointments aim to unify the decision-making center within the capital, prevent dual command among different units, and impose control over what he described as “gray areas” that have remained outside the full control of any party.
Another point the source did not overlook is Burhan’s attempt to project a vision regarding the military’s restructuring, namely that the new Joint Chiefs of Staff consists solely of military personnel and that there is no political influence, in an effort to defuse the tensions that have arisen and the accusations surrounding the military and Islamist control over it.
Messages and Signals
The source argues that the most significant aspect of Burhan’s move is his attempt to send messages to the regional community. He believes these changes carry unspoken messages to Red Sea states involved in the Sudanese issue, as well as to regional powers whose roles in supporting the parties to the conflict are escalating, alongside international concerns that Sudan is turning into an open arena of influence. He said: “Among other objectives, the leadership reshuffle aims to present the army as the sole channel for dealing with the outside world and to block any parallel channels that might involve other powers.”
The Missing Factor
The source emphasized that Burhan carried out these changes with what is described as “the missing factor” in mind: the war economy that emerged during the years of conflict. He explained that the war has spawned a parallel financial system involving gold, smuggling networks, external support, and local funding sources. This makes the leadership reshuffle a move that goes beyond the military dimension to an attempt to control these resources, prevent their leakage, and redirect them to serve the war effort.
The source emphasized that the decisions made within the military cannot be reduced to a mere reshuffling of the leadership; but rather a political reshaping of the army, representing a deeper transformation from an army fighting a war to a military system managing a state at war, where decisions are not limited to managing operations but extend to redefining the nature of the army itself and determining the shape of the state in the coming phase. He pointed out the paradox that the closer the army comes to achieving complete military victory, the more the chances of reaching a sustainable political solution recede, especially as the hawks hold the reins of war and state decisions, all in the interest of Burhan’s survival.
