The Sudanese pound is no longer just a number fluctuating on exchange rate screens, nor is the dollar merely a commodity tracked by traders and speculators in the markets. During the years of war, the currency crisis has moved from the pages of the business section to the details of daily life, and the collapse of the pound is now measured in a harsher way: by the number of meals a family can afford, by what remains of a salary after buying food, by an employee’s ability to pay rent, and by whether a patient can buy medicine and a student can continue their studies. In Sudan, the question for millions of families is no longer “What is the dollar exchange rate today?” but rather, “How much can the pounds in our pockets buy tomorrow?” This is the point at which the currency’s decline becomes more than just a monetary crisis; it turns into a cost-of-living crisis, then a social crisis, and finally a complete realignment of Sudanese families’ priorities in areas under Burhan’s control.
Al-Burhan’s Areas
The picture is clearer in the areas under military control, which include vast swaths of the north, east, and center of the country, including the states of Red Sea, Kassala, Gedaref, River Nile, and Northern, as well as Khartoum, Al-Jazirah, White Nile, Sennar, and parts of Blue Nile.
Despite the diversity of these regions and their varying circumstances, they share a single economy burdened by war: production has declined, trade routes have been disrupted, transportation has become more expensive, infrastructure has been damaged, and state resources have shrunk, while the cost of financing the war and providing basic services has risen simultaneously.
The World Bank estimates that the Sudanese economy contracted by about 29.4% in 2023, and then by an additional 14% in 2024, following the massive shock caused by the war. Government revenues also fell from about 10% of GDP in 2022 to less than 5% in 2024 and 2025. Thus, Sudanese citizens found themselves facing a dual crisis: a currency losing its value and a productive economy lacking the strength to offset this loss through increased production, income, and job opportunities.
Markets in areas controlled by the army are experiencing an unprecedented wave of inflation and price hikes that seem absurd when compared to areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces, according to what citizens told “Raino” yesterday. Prices of basic commodities have reached exorbitant levels that are placing a heavy burden on families; the price of a loaf of bread (two loaves) 1,000 pounds, a single egg 1,000 pounds, a kilo of chicken 30,000 pounds, and a block of ice between 15,000 and 20,000 pounds.
In the vegetable and food market, a kilo of okra cost 8,000 pounds, a kilo of tomatoes cost 18,000 pounds, while a kilo of potatoes remained at 5,000 pounds and eggplant at 3,000 pounds; meanwhile, the price of a kilo of sugar ranged between 5,000 and 6,000 pounds, The price of a kilo of rice was 10,000 pounds, lentils 8,000 pounds, and a pound of yogurt 1,500 pounds. As for red meat, a kilo of lamb was priced at 40,000 pounds, and a kilo of veal at 30,000 pounds.
The Dollar Crushes the Pound
Observers believe this is linked to the availability of hard currency, particularly the dollar. Before the war broke out in April 2023, the dollar was trading at around 570 pounds on the official market; three years later, the figures seem to belong to an entirely different currency. By April 2026, the official exchange rate for the dollar ranged between 3,500 and 3,600 pounds, while the parallel market took a completely different path, surging in July to levels exceeding 5,400 pounds. The average trading rate reached about 5,600 pounds on July 10, with some markets recording levels close to 5,800 pounds; however, it has now hit 6,000 pounds and may even be higher.
Economic analysts believe that when the pound loses its value against the dollar, not only do the prices of imported goods rise, but the impact extends to domestic goods as well, because Sudanese producers themselves require fuel, spare parts, machinery, fertilizers, pesticides, packaging, and transportation—all sectors linked to varying degrees to foreign currency—making the dollar a presence in the market even when it does not appear on the invoice for the goods. More seriously, the parallel market has, in many cases, become a benchmark for traders’ expectations even when the goods themselves are not imported using dollars.
According to prevailing views, the scarcity of freely convertible currency—due to the large-scale purchases by the Burhan government, as well as speculation driven by warlords and arms dealers—has apparently caused an unprecedented economic collapse.
Inflation Takes Its Toll
According to “Raino” reports, the World Bank indicated that annual inflation in Sudan jumped to about 170% in 2024, up from 66% in 2023, and continued to rise to 45.84% last April, driven by higher food, housing, and transportation prices, disruptions in distribution channels, declining production, and shortages of inputs, as well as the authorities’ resorting to increasing the money supply to address resource shortages.
However, Sudanese households do not experience the “inflation rate”; rather, they experience the actual prices they pay in the market. A decline in inflation does not mean a drop in prices; rather, it means that prices are rising at a slower pace, stabilizing at a new level at which households do not regain their previous purchasing power.
As the real value of wages erodes—because the rate of increase in the cost of living outpaces nominal wage increases—some Sudanese no longer view their wages as monthly income, but rather as a limited number of days they can survive before the month runs out.
The Daily Measure
Food is the best indicator of the collapse in purchasing power, as prices devour the lion’s share of limited and middle-income earnings, and coarse grain prices remain exceptionally high due to the conflict and currency weakness.
Media reports indicated that sorghum prices rose by an average of 4% over the course of a single month in March 2026, and in May 2026, UN agencies warned that approximately 19.5 million Sudanese were facing crisis-level or worse food insecurity.
When income is no longer sufficient to purchase the basic food basket, families begin to cut back on quantities, substitute meat with other foods, go into debt, and sell their possessions—ultimately sacrificing medical care and education. Other sectors, such as services, transportation, housing, medicine, and education, are also paying the price for this collapse; High fuel costs are doubling transportation fares; the housing crisis is complicating the return of displaced persons and returnees; and imported and domestic medicines are forcing patients to make difficult choices, while government employees, pensioners, day laborers, farmers, and merchants are losing their ability to keep pace with rampant inflation.
Insights and Analyses
It is not possible to treat the areas under military control as a single economic market. Port Sudan, Atbara, Gedaref, Khartoum, and Wad Madani are affected differently depending on their proximity to ports, the condition of roads, security, fuel availability, banking liquidity, and the number of displaced persons; however, they all share the same currency pressures and weak productive capacity.
Furthermore, the collapse of the pound is redistributing wealth within society in favor of those who hold foreign currency, gold, or fixed assets, while causing widespread hardship for those who rely on fixed salaries in pounds. This turns the currency crisis into a tool for reshaping the social structure and widening the living standards gap between different groups.
In an interview with “Raino,” economist Dr. Essam Ali Hussein noted that the erosion of the pound means a decline in its purchasing power—or what is known in economics as inflation—which is an economic phenomenon reflecting the extent of the imbalance in macroeconomic policies. Pointing out that this directly affects citizens’ living conditions.
he added:“ The loss of the pound’s purchasing power effectively means higher prices for goods and services, which in turn leads to reduced consumption, as some families—especially those with limited incomes—are forced to forgo luxury and premium goods and focus their efforts on purchasing only basic necessities. This results in a decline in quality of life—particularly in terms of food, health, and education—and consequently leads to what is known as recession, which in turn widens the cycle of poverty.” He continued: “The erosion of the pound’s value leads to the erosion of financial savings, directly halts lending among citizens, and increases interest rates on bank loans, which affects production.”
Hussein pointed out that there is an indirect impact on people’s lives through its effect on investment, which in turn increases the balance of payments deficit and creates an imbalance in the trade balance because it weakens the state’s ability to export. This is in addition to the negative social consequences that inflation imposes on societal values, customs, and traditions, such as the spread of bribery and administrative corruption, as well as rising crime rates.
Overall, the collapse of the pound is merely a symptom of a deeper crisis characterized by the war’s disruption of production and exports, a decline in government revenues, and the push of citizens toward defensive behaviors—such as shifting their funds into safe assets and havens—as the national currency gradually loses its value and credibility.
Breaking this vicious cycle requires a comprehensive approach that begins with ending the war, followed by the revival of agriculture and industry, the construction of roads, energy infrastructure, and banks; the restoration of exports; the reform of public finances; and the protection of wages and pensions—all of which will restore the Sudanese pound’s true meaning and value when people trust that what they possess today will still have meaning tomorrow.
