American writer Stephen A. Cook argues that Saudi Arabia today finds itself caught between Iran and the Houthis, in a difficult situation for which U.S. President Donald Trump bears a large part of the responsibility. However, he also believes that Riyadh has contributed to this outcome through a series of strategic mistakes and misjudgments of the regional environment.
Cook notes that the Saudi leadership spent the past decade seeking to achieve regional stability so it could implement the economic and social transformation project led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and the Middle East had reached a degree of calm that allowed Riyadh to build on its ambitions for Vision 2030. However, Hamas’s attack on Israel in October 2023 sparked a widespread regional war from which Saudi Arabia tried to distance itself as much as possible; yet, according to the author, the lack of strategic vision made its problems even more complex.
The Bombing of Sana’a… An Unnecessary Mistake
Cook considers the recent escalation with the Houthi group—which began on July 13 when the Saudi Air Force bombed the runway at Sana’a International Airport—to be a strategic mistake.
He notes that the strike was intended to prevent an aircraft belonging to the Iranian airline Mahan Air from landing in Sana’a after transporting a Houthi delegation from the funeral of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The author acknowledges that Mahan Air is routinely used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to transport support to its allies in the region, and that it is reasonable to believe the Houthi delegation was not carrying “just pistachios and carpets,” but he believes that destroying the runway was not worth the risk.
He adds that Saudi Arabia had turned a blind eye to even greater provocations by the Houthis and the Revolutionary Guard in recent years, and therefore could have ignored this flight as well, especially since the war with the Houthis had effectively subsided—despite specific Saudi complaints that Iran had not honored its commitments following the 2023 agreement to normalize relations.
The Houthis’ Response
The response came swiftly, as the Houthis launched attacks on: • Abha International Airport. • Oil facilities in Jazan. • They also imposed a blockade on Saudi shipping in the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
At the same time, pro-Iranian Iraqi factions, in coordination with the Houthis, targeted Aramco facilities in Yanbu and the oil processing complex in Abqaiq, one of the world’s most important energy facilities. Saudi Arabia Alone
The author notes that Riyadh found itself facing the Houthis alone.
With the exception of statements of condemnation and solidarity, no Arab country actually intervened to defend Saudi Arabia, arguing that most Arab states are either too weak or too hesitant to confront the Houthis.
He adds that the UAE was the only country capable of providing tangible support, but Saudi Arabia lost Abu Dhabi’s cooperation due to their disagreements over Yemen.
Another Mistake in Yemen
Cook argues that Riyadh committed another strategic error when it confronted the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council after it had taken control of most of southern Yemen and declared its intention to move toward independence.
Instead of exploiting this development to put pressure on the Houthis, Saudi Arabia bombed the Southern Transitional Council’s forces, expelled its leaders from the country, and demanded that the UAE stay out of the Yemeni conflict—a demand to which Abu Dhabi complied.
The author believes that Saudi Arabia was more concerned with preserving Yemen’s unity than with strategic outcomes, even though, in his view, a South Yemen allied with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would have exerted significant pressure on the Houthis and Iran.
Riyadh’s Position on Somaliland
The author argues that Saudi Arabia also erred when it opposed Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.
In his view, an Israeli presence in Somaliland would have given Riyadh an additional leverage against the Houthis and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
He says that Saudi Arabia’s opposition stemmed from its anger over Emirati-Israeli coordination there, while Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar had different reasons for opposing recognition.
He believes that Riyadh lost a strategic opportunity due to its disagreements with Abu Dhabi.
Trump Was Not the Expected Ally
Cook argues that Donald Trump’s presence in the White House further complicated the Saudi position.
He recalls that Saudi Arabia strongly opposed the nuclear deal Barack Obama signed with Iran and feared that Joe Biden would repeat the experience; however, the Biden administration ultimately chose to strengthen security cooperation with Riyadh and negotiate a bilateral defense agreement.
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia preferred Trump’s return to power, believing him to be better able to close deals and support investments.
However, the author argues that Trump disappointed Riyadh twice: • When, after signing the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, he added a condition requiring the normalization of relations with Israel—a condition that Riyadh says it will not accept until a Palestinian state is established. • And when he failed to respond to the Iranian attack targeting Aramco facilities in September 2019, effectively ending what was known as the “Carter Doctrine” regarding the protection of Gulf security.
He also argues that Operation Epic Fury, launched by the Trump administration against Iran, effectively ended up strengthening Tehran’s influence rather than weakening it, leaving the Gulf states to bear the consequences of the war.
Buying Loyalties Is Not Enough
The author concludes his article by stating that 2026 has turned into a “disastrous year” for Saudi Arabia, and that the country still faces months that may bring further challenges.
He argues that the policy of buying influence—or “Riyalpolitik”—a reference to the use of money to contain adversaries—is no longer sufficient.
He concludes that Saudi Arabia needs to rethink its approach to foreign policy, abandon the emotional considerations and rigid principles that have guided its decisions in recent years, and develop a more nuanced understanding of its strategic environment.
He concludes by saying that only this may give Riyadh the opportunity to shape the region’s future, rather than finding itself forced to adapt to what others impose on it.
