With increasing international pressure to implement the Quartet’s plan to end the war that has been ongoing in Sudan since mid-April 2023, the Muslim Brotherhood and associated economic and commercial interest groups have intensified their campaign against the international plan. What do these networks consist of? Why are they using the war as a means to achieve their goals? What tools are they using?
After the overthrow of the Brotherhood regime in April 2019, the Sudanese public was shocked by the extent of the control exercised by networks of interests and privileges over the security and economic components of the state, and by the enormous corruption revealed by the committee formed to dismantle these networks.
During the three decades of Brotherhood rule, these networks managed to reshape state institutions through a policy of “empowerment” and created economic and security chains that continued to control all aspects of the state.
In the aftermath of the revolution, these networks turned into a “claw of destruction,” vigorously seeking to abort the civilian transition, supporting the coup by army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in October 2021, and, after widespread popular rejection of the coup, working to ignite war and oppose any attempts to stop it.
After the failure of the October 2021 coup, these networks sought to ignite war in April 2023, using their influence within the military establishment and their financial and media networks to fuel the conflict as a means of ensuring their continued control over the scene and preventing any transitional experiment that would combat systematic corruption and hold those involved accountable.
Observers believe that any effort to resolve the crisis in Sudan must link ending the war to ending the Brotherhood’s control and networks of privileges over the army, security, and economy, and dismantling the networks of empowerment.
Who are the privileged?
Observers describe the set of privileges and interests that drive the war to continue as “a vast network comprising remnants of the empowerment system built by the Brotherhood regime over three decades.”
This circle includes political leaders and figures affiliated with the organization, warlords from armed movements, and economic groups linked to gold and smuggling networks and the parallel economy that flourished under the protection of the former regime. It also includes military and security figures who played a direct role in the October 2021 coup and in igniting the conflict.
Writer and political researcher Ibrahim Barasi told Sky News Arabia that “these groups did not hide their concern about the civilian transition after the April 2019 revolution, as the dismantling of their empowerment revealed the extent of their financial and security influence in state institutions.”
He added: “With the opening of corruption files and the spread of demands for accountability, these networks saw that any real civilian transition would mean the end of influence that had taken decades to build, so they opposed the political settlement in all its forms, from Jeddah to Manama to Geneva and then the Quartet.”
Barsi points out that “the network of privileges and interests that opposes ending the war includes the same group that supported the October 2021 coup and then played a role in igniting the April 2023 war, considering the war an opportunity to rearrange the scene, not a threat.”
He believes that “the motives of these networks are not only political but also existential,” explaining: “The war gives them greater margins of influence and prevents the establishment of a civilian authority with the power to hold them accountable, making the continuation of fighting a means of protecting privileges and preventing the return of the institutional state.”
A long-term strategy:
According to Mahdi Daoud Al-Khalifa, a parliamentarian and former Sudanese foreign minister, “historical evidence and current data clearly indicate that the group of privileges and interests, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, it pursues a long-term strategy that relies on the continuation of conflict as a means of weakening civilian forces and reproducing networks of influence and resources.
Al-Khalifa explains: “This group seeks to perpetuate conflict as a tool to reproduce its power and maintain its positions of influence within the army, enabling it to obtain war resources such as gold and minerals and control the rentier economy that finances these networks and sustains their political, military, and economic operations.”
He points out that “these networks work to perpetuate the conflict, with the aim of distracting civil society and disrupting the formation of national alliances capable of confronting their project.”
However, Al-Khalifa warns that the actions of these networks will lead to further economic and social collapse, an increase in the number of displaced persons and deaths, and further dismantling of state institutions, making a return to peace more difficult in the future.
Tools for mobilizing opposition to ending the war:
The networks of the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated groups are leveraging their extensive economic, media, and security influence to expand their call for the war to continue.
Financial power is one of the main tools currently used by the organization to mobilize opposition to ending the war.
According to economic experts, over the past 30 years, the organization has managed to build a huge financial base estimated at more than $100 billion by empowering its members in all economic and commercial sectors of the state in exchange for paying a share of their revenues and profits to the ruling party’s treasury.
The party used these funds to build relationships with many terrorist and similar organizations in many countries.
In this context, financial and economic expert Adel Sayed Ahmed says, “The Brotherhood was able to control all ministries and economic institutions by replacing leadership and lower-level positions with party cadres, and all commercial contracts were awarded to merchants and companies affiliated with the party and groups associated with it.”
Sayed Ahmed explained to Sky News Arabia: “The party’s networks and economically affiliated interest groups expanded and their funds grew significantly.”
In terms of security, the network of privileges relies on the Brotherhood’s strong influence within the army and security institutions, which has led to the rejection of 10 international and regional initiatives calling for an end to the war so far.
Since the early 1990s, the organization has worked to empower its members within the army and security agencies and to form armed militias that have recruited thousands of young people to protect it, most notably the Al-Baraa Battalion, the Popular Defense Forces, and the Popular Security Forces, to which it has allocated billions of dollars, provided high-end equipment, and granted significant powers.
In the media sphere, interest groups and privileges are used to promote the narrative of continuing the war through a huge media network that includes a number of websites and television channels, in addition to rooms specializing in spreading rumors and fabricated news on social media platforms. Hundreds of thousands of dollars are also paid to public relations companies in various countries.
Journalist and political analyst Mohamed al-Mukhtar Mohamed warns that “networks of interests and privileges benefit from the widespread use of social media platforms.”
He tells Sky News Arabia: “Through thousands of fake accounts, organized chat rooms, and channels affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, the media networks of privilege groups work to spread rumors and messages that serve the cause of continuing the war.”
