The diplomatic defeat of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the African Union battle underscores the widening gap between a rising Africa—moving quietly yet resolutely toward reclaiming its decision-making independence and freeing the continent from dependency—and those who still believe they can deceive, belittle, and manipulate Africans and their leaders. They have failed to realize that black-and-white television and transistor radios have long been consigned to the archives of human heritage.
Egypt did not learn from France’s defeat in West and Central Africa. Instead, it persists in the same old practices it exercised in Sudan—marked by condescension and mockery. One need only look at its treatment of Sudanese refugees on its own soil. Egypt was not content, nor did it learn from its policy of treating others as “just one grain in the dozen.” It even drew Saudi Arabia behind it—a country we once viewed as a canopy of humanitarianism. Yet even Quraysh had its unbelievers.
As for Turkey, its harsh colonial history in Sudan, and the bitter defeat it suffered at the hands of the horsemen of the pastoral periphery (the social bases of the Rapid Support Forces), may perhaps explain its attempt at revenge against the people of Darfur. Just yesterday, its Akinci aircraft reportedly killed more than 18 unarmed civilians and children at the “Kilo Market” bus station in Saraf Omra, in the city of Zalingei, the capital of Central Darfur State.
Ironically, were it not for the people of Darfur, the Ottomans might have been brought to their knees in the First World War. Our people from across Darfur fought in Turkey—where today there remains a considerable number of Turkish citizens of Darfuri origin. Notably, the countries engaged in supporting the Port Sudan government possess significant symbolic and religious weight in the Muslim world. Egypt hosts Al-Azhar Al-Sharif. Saudi Arabia is home to the Two Holy Mosques. Turkey inherits the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Sudan itself is overwhelmingly Muslim.
Yet this symbolic weight has not translated into an inclusive mediation aimed at reconciliation. Instead, in the view of many, it has appeared biased toward one party at the expense of another—contradicting the religious discourse that calls for justice and reform.
Politically, this bias can be understood within the framework of national security calculations:
Egypt views Sudan as a strategic depth and a backyard affecting its water and border security.
Saudi Arabia sees the Red Sea as a gateway to its national security and a vital corridor for its economic projects.
Turkey seeks to preserve a foothold in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa equation.
But understanding interests does not justify legitimizing a coup—something rejected by an African majority wary of repeating a model that would undermine what remains of the continent’s democratic transition path.
Sudan… The Open State and Loose Wealth
Part of the crisis is inseparable from the fragility of the Sudanese state itself. Since independence, Sudan—compared to neighboring countries—has remained a soft-border state, open without a strict system regulating residency or foreign labor.
It fits the popular saying: “Loose money teaches theft.” When strong state institutions are absent, the country becomes an open arena for regional competition, and sovereignty erodes under the weight of overlapping interventions.
This raises a fundamental question: Is the fault with Egypt or Saudi Arabia for pursuing their interests? Or with the Sudanese political elites—particularly the Khartoum elite—who internationalized their crisis and mortgaged their decision-making? Sudan’s political history reveals deep entanglements with regional capitals, to the point that some elites are accused of being products of external balances rather than purely national forces.
Brotherhood Hostility… and Alliances of Necessity
Ironically, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have historically waged fierce struggles against the Muslim Brotherhood within their own borders. Yet some actors associated with political Islam in Sudan have found themselves within the calculations of current alliances.
This complexity suggests that the conflict is not purely ideological but rather governed by pragmatic interests and power balances. And we love you, Sudan.
